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1. Introduction 
Let us consider the following two examples.  Suppose a car manufacturer has to choose one 
from many potential prototype projects in order to launch a new car model.  The selection 
criteria must pay attention to both technical (performance) and esthetical (design) 
considerations.  Since the company policy gives high priority to safety and quality standards, 
the selection procedure is organized as follows.  First, a group of engineers from R&D 
department tests the technical performance of each available project and, based on the 
information gathered, selects, let us say, n best projects to be further investigated.  Then, a 
group of designers from the marketing department compares those projects and, depending on 
how “good” they look, selects the model that will be eventually launched in the market.  There 
are two types of complications that make the decision-making in this example very difficult.  
The first comes form the consideration that companies have limited budgets and, consequently, 
the resources each department can allocate to projects’ evaluations are limited.  In our example 
it is reasonable to assume that, if the marketing department is left with too many projects, it 
will not be able to rank them very accurately.  Therefore, the actual number of projects pre-
selected by the R&D department may well affect the overall accuracy of the selection 
procedure.  The second complication arises from the fact that communication is always 
imperfect.  This is due to inevitable information contamination, or to a high degree of 
specialization, which makes it hard for people with different backgrounds to understand each 
other.  In the example, it is a necessity to combine both performance and design characteristics 
into a single measure that requires information sharing between the two departments.  Hence, 
the overall quality of selection crucially depends on information that is actually communicated 
between R&D and marketing departments. 
In the second example we look at an individual who must select a car for a purchase.  He, 
first, looks through a car magazine and, based on the information he gathers there (i.e., prices, 
features, driving performance, etc.) selects a number of car models he may be interested in.  
Then, he goes to a car dealer where he personally compares the “look-and feel” of the cars 
selected form the magazine and, eventually, buys one of them.  Like the budget of a company, 
the time and attention that a person can allocate to interpret different alternatives are limited.  
In our example one may think that the accuracy with which the individual is able to investigate 
each car decreases if his attention is spread over too many models.  Moreover, as his decision 
must rely on different pieces of information obtained at different points in time, the information 
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the individual remembers from the magazine can be crucial for the overall quality of the 
decision made. 
These two examples clearly show that internal information-processing limitations may 
prevent an otherwise perfect decision-maker (an organization in the former example and an 
individual in the latter example) from selecting the best feasible alternative with certainty.  It is 
the limited amount of information an individual can absorb at a time, and his limited memory 
capacity that are responsible for such imperfections.  Similarly, organizations of individuals 
have constraints both in acquiring and communicating information.  Hence, the amount of 
information may adversely affect the outcome of the selection procedure.  Quantitatively, more 
information means more alternatives and this requires more resources to evaluate all 
alternatives.  Qualitatively, more complex information requires more resources to evaluate each 
alternative. 
In accordance with this dichotomy we distinguish two limitations in information 
processing.  The first one manifests itself in a sample size - accuracy trade-off: the more 
alternatives are simultaneously processed, the smaller is the accuracy with which each 
alternative is evaluated.  We will refer to this limitation as imperfect information acquisition.  
The second limitation plays a role on the information transmission level due to imperfect 
communication between members of the same organization, or to the fact that an individual 
does not remember some information that he previously knew.  Since a decision-maker can be 
thought as an information–processing network, this limitation can be interpreted as imperfect 
transmission form one node of the decision-maker’s internal structure to another.  We will, 
therefore, call it imperfect information transmission. 
The aim of this paper is to incorporate both these information-processing limitations in a 
model of fully rational individuals.  More precisely, we consider a two-stage selection 
procedure with two selectors who evaluate an exogenous number of alternatives in order to 
select the best one.  Since selectors can be seen as two team members of the same organization 
in the sense of Marschak and Radner (1972), or as one individual who moves at two different 
points in time (possibly, with imperfect recall), the selection problem can be naturally modeled 
as a two-stage game where two players have the same preferences over the outcomes of the 
game. 
The game is as follows.  First, nature assigns the types to each alternative.  For the sake of 
simplicity, alternatives are assumed to come into two types: high or low.  In stage 1, each 
alternative generates an imprecise binary, i.e., high or low, signal about its quality.  Having 
observed the signal outcomes, selector 1 selects a sub-sample of the alternatives to be passed to 
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the next stage.  In stage 2 each pre-selected alternative generates another imprecise binary 
signal, and selector 2 selects one out of them.  The payoff of each selector is the probability that 
a high quality alternative is selected in stage 2. 
In terms of the model the first example is formalized as follows.  Each project can be of 
either high or low quality.  Both R&D and marketing departments are given criteria that they 
apply to projects.  First, the R&D department screens all the projects.  It observes a high signal 
if a project meets the requirement and a low signal otherwise.  Based on these observations, the 
R&D department selects a sub-sample of projects and passes it to the second selection stage, 
i.e., to the marketing department.  Similarly, the latter applies its criterion to each alternative in 
the sub-sample and observes a high signal if a project meets the requirement. 
In general settings, each type of alternatives may generate either a high or a low signal in 
every stage.  We also consider two special cases of the model, where results can be generalized 
to an arbitrary number of stages.  In the first case the screening requirements are set so high 
that no low quality alternative can ever meet them.  We call this case high-standard filtering 
selection as only high types can pass screening filters by generating high signals.  In the 
opposite case the screening requirements are set so low that every high quality alternative 
meets them for sure.  We call this case low-standard filtering selection as only low types may 
fail to pass screening filters by generating low signals. 
In our analysis we consider four cases.  The first one is a benchmark case where the two 
information-processing limitations are absent: both transmission and acquisition of information 
are perfect.  This situation is captured by assuming that all information obtained at stage 1, i.e., 
signal outcomes that each alternative generated in stage 1, is available at stage 2, and that the 
accuracy of signals in stage 2 is constant.  We refer to this case as full memory and constant 
accuracy case (FM-CA case).  The benchmark scenario is reminiscent of a perfect statistical 
environment where handling large samples is not costly and all the information gathered form 
sequential experiments could be used.  In order to analyze the effect of each of the information-
processing limitations on the behavior of rational agents, we then depart form the benchmark 
FM-CA scenario by analyzing three other cases.  In the first one the information acquisition is 
kept perfect, but the assumption of perfect information transmission is relaxed by assuming that 
no information gathered in stage 1 is available in stage 2.  We refer to this case as no memory 
and constant accuracy case (NM-CA case).  In the second scenario, on the contrary, the 
information transmission is kept perfect, but not the information acquisition.  We assume there 
that the signals’ accuracy in stage 2 is decreasing in the number of alternatives to be evaluated, 
i.e., in the sample size in stage 2.  We refer to this case as full memory and decreasing accuracy 
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case (FM-DA case).  Lastly, combining both types of imperfections we analyze the fourth 
scenario, which we refer to as no memory and decreasing accuracy case (NM-DA case). 
It turns out that in any scenario, regardless of the underlying informational assumptions, 
there always multiple Nash equilibria exist.  That is why we treat the problem of selecting the 
best alternative from a game-theoretic perspective rather than from a purely statistical point of 
view.  However, there exists a unique trembling-hand perfect Bayes-Nash equilibrium (PBNE) 
for all generic values of the model’s primitives. 
The results are as follows.  The PBNE in FM-CA case is such that independently of the 
signal outcomes in stage 1 all alternatives are passed to stage 2, and selector 2 makes use of 
both signals of each alternative in order to select the best one.  This equilibrium captures a 
well-known concept in statistics: calculate likelihoods of all possible alternatives using all 
available information, and then select the alternative with the largest likelihood value. 
When we depart form the benchmark perfect information scenario, the paradigm “more 
information is better” does not hold true any longer.  Irrespective of the sources of 
imperfection, in some cases selector 1 is better of by neglecting some potentially valuable 
information.  We call this phenomenon information overload.  The causes of information 
overload are different depending on the specific information-processing limitations. 
Introducing the no memory assumption, not surprisingly, reduces incentives of selector 1 
to select both high and low signals into a single pool as such mixing makes it impossible for 
selector 2 to distinguish between them later on.  However, mixing does occur in equilibrium, 
although only a subset of the low signals is selected.  The PBNE in NM-CA case has the 
following properties: all high signals in stage 1 are passed to stage 2, while some low signals 
may not be selected.  Thus, in no-memory settings, information overload takes the form of a 
bound on the number of relatively bad alternatives to be passed to the next selection round.  
This upper-bound of the number of low signals is decreasing in the number of high signals 
observed, in the prior share of high type alternatives in the population, and in the screening 
accuracy in stage 1. 
In the FM-DA case, it is the decrease in accuracy in stage 2 that prevents selector 1 form 
taking too many alternatives, and that gives rise to information overload.  The PBNE in FM-
DA case has the following properties: either all high signals are selected but some low signals 
are neglected, or some high signals are neglected and no low signals are selected.  Thus, in 
decreasing accuracy settings, information overload takes the form of a bound on the total 
number of alternatives, i.e., good and bad alternatives, to be passed to the next selection round.  
Contrary to the NM-CA case, in the FM-DA case the screening accuracy in stage 1 has an 
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ambiguous impact on the upper-bound of the number of low signals while both the number of 
high signals observed and the prior share of high type alternatives in the population negatively 
and monotonically affect it. 
In the fourth scenario, when both sources of informational imperfections are present, 
information overload takes its most severe form as both imperfections work hand-in-hand and 
bound the sample size even further. 
Finally, in multi-stage filtering selection we obtain the following results.  In case of high-
standard filtering selection information overload never occurs.  The initial set of alternatives 
passes through screening filters on every stage until at least one high signal is generated and 
one of the corresponding alternatives is selected.  On the other hand, if the standards are low, 
only high signals are passed to the next stage, and on the later stages of the selection 
information will be heavily overloaded.  More precisely, only two high signals are passed to the 
next stage provided that the alternatives have passed a sufficiently large number of filtering 
stages. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews the existing related 
literature.  Section 3 states the model.  Section 4 analyzes four different informational 
scenarios, namely the benchmark FM-CA case and NM-CA, FM-DA and NM-DA cases.  
Section 5 analyzes two special filtering selection cases and section 6 concludes.  The appendix 
contains all the proofs. 
2. Related literature 
This paper relates primarily to the bounded rationality literature on limited capacity.  Since the 
assumption of perfect rationality has been questioned in the 50’s, economic theory started a 
hunt for «Rational choice that takes into account the cognitive limitations of the decision 
maker – limitations of both knowledge and computational capacity», Simon (1987).  In the 
existing literature much attention has been focused on finding plausible ways to model bounded 
rationality.  Limited capacity models emphasize the role of cognitive heuristics and simplifying 
knowledge structures in reducing information-processing demands.  Lipman (1995) provides an 
exhaustive survey of such economic literature where authors use different ways to model 
information-processing limitations. 
Morris (1992), Lipman (1992) and Gilboa and Schmeidler (1992) follow an axiomatic 
approach.  In non axiomatic models, processing limitations take a form of computational 
constraints like in Spear (1989), Anderlini (1991), and Anderlini and Felli (1992), or a form of 
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a costly processing phase like in Rubinstein (1986), Abreu and Rubinstein (1988), and Kalai 
and Stanford (1988).  Finally, Mount and Reiter (1990), and Radner and van Zandt (1992) 
study information processing limitations in the context of optimal processing networks. 
Yet, there are relatively few papers that explore the implications of bounded rationality.  
The main reason is the lack of agreements on how to model this phenomenon.  Our paper is a 
contribution in this direction as it enables us to endogenously explain a phenomenon of 
information overload, which is usually imposed exogenously in most bounded rationality 
models.  Therefore, our model provides a rational foundation to bounded rationality in a form 
of information overload. 
The idea that human brain is better equipped for working with relatively small number of 
alternatives has also been extensively exploited in the field of psychology.  Baddley (1994) 
gives a good overview of this literature.  More precisely, in his seminal paper, G. A. Miller 
(1956) pointed out that it is the span of absolute judgment and the span of immediate memory 
that imposes severe limitations on the amount of information we are able to simultaneously 
process and remember.  We account for those two limitations in an economic framework by 
introducing imperfect information acquisition and imperfect information transmission. 
Iimperfect information acquisition has also been present in many economic studies, both 
empirical and theoretical.  Early, as well as more recent, works in marketing (see Jacoby et al. 
(1974) and Hahn et al. (1992), among others) provide evidence that supports the adverse effect 
of excessive information on the quality of the decision.  Chernev (2003) points out that such 
phenomenon becomes even stronger when preferences do not have articulated attributes, and 
vanishes when preferences are more articulated.  Most theoretical models (see van Zandt 
(2001), among others) introduce imperfect information acquisition in a form of an exogenous 
hard limit on the number of items an individual can process.  In contrast, in Ficco (2004) 
imperfect information acquisition is also modeled as a sample size - accuracy trade-off, but its 
implications are studied in the context of a monopsony market. 
Imperfect information transmission is taken into account by the literature on the economics 
of organizations, which is also closely related to our model.  The idea that individuals have 
limited capacities to process information suggests that organizations (groups of individuals) 
may be able to make better decisions than any single individual.  Consequently, a substantial 
amount of such literature views individual agents as single nodes in a large information-
processing network of the organization.  Although information transmission imperfections 
appeared in many of these studies (See, e.g., Radner (1993), Sah and Stiglitz (1986), Visser 
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(2000), among many others.), they have not yet been treated in the context of imperfect 
information acquisition in a fully rational environment. 
Our model in no memory settings also studies the implications of imperfect recall on a 
multistage selection problem.  A substantial amount of literature has been devoted to address 
different issues concerning the imperfect recall assumption in multistage games (see. i.e., 
Battigalli (1997), Gilboa (1997), Grove and Halpern (1997), Halpern (1997), Lipman (1997), 
and Piccione and Rubinstein (1997a, 1997b)). 
We share with Moscarini and Smith (2002) the interpretation of the amount of information 
as the number of drawn signal outcomes.  Finally, in our multistage selection model learning 
occurs via Bayes updating.  On the contrary, Borgers, Morales and Sarin (2004) consider 
general learning rules in environments in which little prior and feedback information is 
available to the decision maker. 
3. The Model 
There are two selectors and a population of N alternatives, which come into two types: high-
type and low-type, denoted as θH and θL respectively.  The expected share of θH within the 
population is denoted by α.  The game lasts two stages.  In stage 1 each alternative generates a 
binary signal { }LH sss 111 ,∈ , i.e., either a high signal Hs1  or a low signal Ls1 , which is correlated 
with its true type with the following revealing probabilities: 
( ) ( )1,0Pr 11 ∈= HHH qs θ , ( ) ( )1,0Pr 11 ∈= LLL qs θ . 
Having observed a signal composition (H1,L1), i.e., H1 high signals and L1 low signals, selector 
1 selects a sub-sample of alternatives (h1,l1), which consists of [ ]11 ,0 Hh ∈  high signals and 
[ ]11 ,0 Ll ∈  low signals. 
In stage 2, each pre-selected alternative again generates a binary signal { }LH sss 222 ,∈  in 
accordance with the revealing probabilities ( )1,02 ∈Hq  and ( )1,02 ∈Lq .  In FM-case selector 2 
makes his choice based on two signals, s1 and s2, observed in both stages.  The pair (s1, s2) 
determines the overall likelihood value for each alternative.  In NM-case, on the contrary, the 
signaling history is not available, and selector 2 makes his choice based only on signals s2.  
Having observed realizations of signals in stage 2, selector 2 selects one alternative, which 
becomes the outcome of the selection procedure.  We assume that all signals in stages 1 and 2 
are statistically independent: 
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Assumption 1.  ( ) ( ) ( )iii ssss θθθ 2121 PrPr,Pr = , i=H, L. 
For binary types and signals the labeling of the types can always be done in such a way, 
that the so-called monotone likelihood ratio property holds: high signal Hts  gives more chances 
of being generated by a high type θH alternative.  Formally, we assume that it is indeed the 
case. 
Assumption 2.  High and low signals are defined such that LtHt qq −> 1 , and, therefore, for all t: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) LtLtHLttHtt
H
tt
L
tt
H
tt
H
ttH
t
HH
t sqq
q
qq
qs γθ
αα
α
αα
αθγ ≡=
−+−
−
>
−−+
=≡ Pr
11
1
11
Pr . 
The information acquisition technology in the model is represented by revealing 
probabilities Htq  and 
L
tq .  The numbers 
Hq1  and 
Lq1 , i.e., the screening accuracy in stage 1, are 
exogenously given.  In contrast, it is the sample size N2=h1+l1 that determines screening 
accuracy in stage 2.  We assume that both Hq2  and 
Lq2  are either strictly decreasing functions of 
N2 in case of DA, or they are constants in case of CA. 
Since the revealing probability functions q2(n) are strictly decreasing and bounded 
functions in DA cases, they can be written as ( ) ( )nfqnq 12 +=  where 0≥q  and f(x) is a strictly 
increasing function such that f(x)=0.  Function f can be treated as a production function of 
information acquisition technology and its argument n1  represents the amount of resources 
allocated for each alternative.  We assume that q2(n) is a well-behaved function for all large 
enough values of its argument, i.e., f(x) is a well-behaved function at zero. 
Assumption 3.  0>q  and f(x) can be written as ( ) ( )xgxxf λ=  for some λ>0 and an arbitrary 
function g(x), which is differentiable at x=0 and satisfies ( ) 00 >g . 
The pay-off of each player is the probability that a high type alternative Hθ  is eventually 
selected.  An equilibrium strategy for selector 1 is the optimal sample composition 
( ) ( ) ( )( )11*111*1*1*1 ,,,, LHlLHhlh =  for all possible signal compositions (H1,L1).  An equilibrium 
strategy for selector 2 is to select an alternative in accordance with his preference relation by 
comparing likelihoods of each alternative. 
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4. Analysis 
Due to the finiteness of the strategy space of the game, a Bayes-Nash equilibrium always 
exists, possibly in mixed strategies.  Moreover, a pure strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium always 
exists as the players are team members.  In what follows we will consider Bayes-Nash 
equilibria in pure strategies only. 
The model, regardless of the underlying informational assumptions, has always multiple 
Nash equlibria.  In order to see why this is the case, consider the following strategy profile: 
selector 1 passes only one signal, preferably high, to stage2; selector 2 selects one alternative 
with the lowest likelihood of being θH type.  Given the strategy of player 2, player 1 wants to 
effectively end the selection procedure in stage 1 by making the team’s pay-off independent on 
the signal realization in stage 2.  Thus, he optimally selects only one alternative, and it must be 
one who generated a high signal Hs1 , if there is one.  Player 2, in turn, gets the same pay-off 
irrespective of his strategy, thus there is no profitable deviation for him. 
It is clearly seen that the equilibrium we just described is based on playing weakly 
dominated strategies.  That is why in what follows we impose an additional refinement, namely 
that no weakly dominated strategies are a part of an equilibrium.  The set of strategies that are 
not weakly dominated can be characterized as follows: selector 1 (2) selects a number of 
signals (one signal) with the largest likelihood(s) of being θH type. 
We begin with the benchmark FM-CA case, where the informational environment, apart 
from inaccurate screening, is perfect. 
4.1.FM-CA case 
In CA-case there are no costs of passing large samples to stage 2.  In addition, selector 2 
observes all signals from stage 1.  Hence, he can rank all the previously selected alternatives in 
accordance with its preference relation.  Thus, selector 2 has a unique weakly undominated 
strategy.  Selector 1, in turn, selects all potentially valuable alternatives in stage1.  This is the 
content of Proposition 1. 
Proposition 1.  In FM-CA case, the game has a unique PBNE such that: 
a) ( ) 111*1 , HLHh = , i.e., player 1 selects all high signals. 
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i.e., player 1 selects all low signals if the screening accuracy in stage 2 is higher than in 
stage 1 and the other way around. 
c) Player 2 selects an alternative in accordance with the following preference relation 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )LLLHHLHH ssssssss 21212121 ,,,, fff  if L
L
H
H
L
L
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. 
Proposition 1 is proven as a sub-case of Proposition 3 in the appendix.  It can be easily 
generalized to an arbitrary number of stages.  Proposition 1 states one of the most general 
concepts in statistics that prescribes a calculation of full likelihoods for all available 
alternatives and then selection the maximum value.  When the screening accuracy in stage 1 is 
higher than in stage 2, i.e., when ( ) ( )HLHLHH ssss 2121 ,Pr,Pr θθ > , and, therefore, 
( ) ( )HLLH ssss 2121 ,, f , only high signals are selected.  If, on the contrary, stage 2 signaling is more 
accurate, i.e., ( ) ( )HLHLHH ssss 2121 ,Pr,Pr θθ < , selector 1 selects all the alternatives. 
Having established the result in the benchmark case, we will see now how informational 
imperfections affect the resulting equilibrium strategies.  First, we introduce imperfections in 
information transmission, which we classified as no memory case. 
4.2.NM-CA case 
If no information from stage 1 is available for selector 2, he still has a unique strategy but now 
based only on the following preference relation over the signals from stage 2: 
( ) ( )LH ss 22 f . (1) 
Selector 1 now faces the following task.  Observing a signal composition (H1, L1) he has to 
choose a sample composition (h1, l1) to be passed to stage 2 in order to maximize the team’s 
pay-off.  An equilibrium sample composition is denoted by ( )*1*1 ,lh .  Proposition 2 shows how 
the realization of signals in stage 1 affects the optimal sample composition. 
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Proposition 2.  In NM-CA case there exists a generically unique PBNE such that: 
a) ( ) 111*1 , HLHh = , i.e., player 1 selects all high signals. 
b) for all H1≥1 there exist an upper-bound ( ) [ )∞∈ ,011 HL  and a lower-bound 
( ) ( )[ ]1111 ,0 HLHL ∈  such that: 
( ) ( ){ } ( )( )


<
≥
=
111
111111
11
*
1 if,0
if,,min
,
HLL
HLLHLL
LHl , 
i.e., if the number of low signals does not exceed ( )11 HL , none of them are selected; 
otherwise all of them up to ( )11 HL  are selected in stage 1. 
c) ( )11 HL  does not increase and strictly decreases whenever ( ) 011 >HL . 
d) There exists a number ( ) 11~ 11 +≤ LH  such that ( ) ( ) ( ) 0, 111*1 === hLhLLhl  for all 1~Hh ≥ , 
i.e., if there are sufficiently many high signals, none of low signals are selected in stage 1. 
e) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0, 111*1 === hLhLLhl  for all 1≥h  if L
L
H
H
L
L
H
H
q
q
q
q
q
q
q
q
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
1111 −−
<
−−
, i.e., if the 
screening accuracy in stage 1 is higher than in stage 2 none of low signals are selected in 
stage 1. 
f) ( ) 11*1 ,0 LLl = , i.e., if there are no high signals available, all low signals are selected.  
Formally, ( ) +∞=01L , ( ) 001 =L . 
g) The total sample size in stage 1 *1
*
1 lh +  is not a strictly monotone function of H1: it weakly 
decreases when 0*1 >l  and strictly increases when 0
*
1 =l . 
h) Player 2 selects an alternative in accordance with the preference relation (1). 
The statements of Proposition 2 can be understood as follows.  First, PBNE is generically 
unique as the pay-off function of player 1 turns out to be a regular analytical function of the 
model’s primitives and, therefore, takes generically different values for all different values of 
its arguments, which number is finite.  Then, selecting all high signals is always optimal due to 
Assumption 2, part (a).  Selecting one extra low signal has two effects on the pay-off.  The first 
effect, which is positive, is a sample size effect: selecting more signals in stage 1 increases the 
probability of observing at least one high signal in stage 2.  The other effect, which is a mixing 
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effect, is negative due to the no memory assumption.  Mixing high and low signals in stage 1 in 
a single pool makes it impossible to distinguish between them later on in stage 2 and, therefore, 
decreases the probability of selecting the best alternative. 
The sample size effect vanishes exponentially with the number of selected low signals 
while the mixing effect decreases reciprocally to that number.  Hence, for a large number of 
selected low signals the latter dominates the former and there is an upper bound 1L  such that 
1
*
1 Ll ≤ .  If only a few low signals are available, it might be possible that taking none of them is 
optimal even if 01 >L  as the mixing effect is absent in this case.  Thus, the existence of the 
lower bound 1L  is established, part (b). 
When the number of high signals goes up, the sample size effect vanishes faster then the 
mixing effect.  Therefore, selector 1 has less incentives to select low signals.  As a result, the 
upper-bound 1L  strictly decreases w.r.t. H1 until it becomes zero, and stays at zero afterwards, 
part (c) and (d).  Selector 1 selects high and low signals only if the screening accuracy in stage 
1 is lower than in stage 2.  Otherwise none of low signal will be selected, part (e). 
When there are no high signals available, only the sample size effect plays a role and, 
therefore, all low signals must be selected, part (f).  Finally, the total sample size in stage 1 
cannot be a strictly monotone function as for H1=0 and H1=N all signals will be selected, thus 
Nlh =+ *1
*
1  in these two cases. 
As we see, departing from the benchmark case by imposing the no memory assumption 
leads to the overload of information in stage 1.  This phenomenon comes into play when 
selector 1 observers heterogeneous signals.  In this case only a part of low signals will be 
selected in equilibrium and, therefore, only a part of all available information will be used in 
the decision-making, the rest will be neglected.  Due to a non-monotone behavior of the total 
sample size *1
*
1 lh + , it does not fully reveal the sample composition (how many high and low 
signals have been selected in stage 1).  Thus, in a multistage (T>2) selection game, selector 2 
faces a non-trivial task of updating sample composition beliefs, which makes the model 
practically intractable for T>2. 
For exposition purposes we have numerically calculated the function ( )11 HL  in the 
following example. 
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Example 1. 
Picture 1 shows the numerically calculated function ( )11 HL  for α=0.5 and three values of 
LH qq 11 = : 0.51, 0.65 and 0.78.  Its monotone property can be easily seen there, as well as 
non-monotone behavior of the maximum sample size ( ) 111 HHL + . 
Picture 1 also shows how the accuracy in stage 1 affects the sample composition.  If 
the signaling stage 1 is almost uninformative, picture (a), the sample size effect is very 
large and selector 1 aggressively mixes signals for a wide range of H1.  If, on the contrary, 
the accuracy in stage 1 is sufficiently high, picture (c), the mixing effect dominates and 
selector 1 always neglects low signals.  Another feature of the equilibrium is that player 1 
0
5
10
15
0 5 10 15
H
L(H) L(H)+H
 
0
5
10
15
0 5 10 15
H
L(H) L(H)+H
 
0
5
10
15
0 5 10 15
H
L(H) L(H)+H
 
a) 51.01 =q  b) 65.01 =q  c) 78.01 =q  
Picture 1. 
The upper-bound 1L , denoted as L(H), and the maximum sample size in stage 1, denoted as L(H)+H, as functions 
of H1, denoted as H, for 9.022 ==
LH qq , α=0.5 and different values of 111 qqq
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== . 
 
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
L =0
0<L <5
40<L
5<L <10
10<L <20
20<L <40
 
Picture 2 
Regions of the primitives where ( )11LL =  takes particular values.  Here the space of variable primitives is 
( ) [ ] [ ]1,5.01,0, 1 ×=qα  with 111 qqq LH == , and 9.022 == LH qq . 
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selects “very many” low signals only if the prior is low, the accuracy in stage 1 is low and 
the number of high signals available is also low. 
Picture 2 shows regions of the prior α and the first stage accuracy LH qq 11 =  where 
( )11LL =  takes different values, for the case 9.022 == LH qq .  One may note that both the 
prior and the first stage accuracy monotonically and negatively affect the upper-bound 
( )11L .  This monotone dependence of ( )11 HL  is confirmed by numerous numerical 
calculations, yet the analytical proof is to be found. // 
Summarizing, imperfect information transmission between selectors limits the number of 
low signals selected in stage 1.  The mixing effect, which is responsible for such information 
overload, gets relatively stronger if: (i) the prior share of high type alternatives in the 
population is larger; (ii) signaling in stage 1 is more informative; (iii) the number of high 
signals in stage 1 is larger. 
Having established the properties of NM-CA equilibrium we turn to another imperfection 
of information processing, namely to imperfect information acquisition.  This is tFM-DA case. 
4.3.FM-DA case 
In FM-CA case we have seen that the preferences of selector 2 are different for different values 
of the primitives of the model.  If the accuracy in stage 1 is higher than in stage 2, signal 
realization ( )LH ss 21 ,  is preferred to ( )HL ss 21 ,  and the other way around.  In FM-DA case, 
however, the accuracy in stage 2 is endogenously determined by the sample size, i.e., by the 
number of alternatives selected in stage 1.  But the sample size is the variable that is readily 
observable in stage 2.  Hence, selector 1, by selecting alternatives, implicitly selects one of the 
two possible preference relations, and selector 2 has consistent preferences in all states of the 
world, i.e., for all possible signal realization in stage 2. 
Thus, like in FM-CA case, selector 2 has a unique weakly undominated strategy, which is 
determined by its preference relation, which, in turn, is determined by selector 1.  For the sake 
of the simplicity of exposition we assume here that both revealing probability functions 
coincide, i.e., ( ) ( ) ( )nqnqnq LH 222 == . 
It turns out that there exists a generically unique PBNE of the game, which always exhibits 
information overload in stage 1. 
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Proposition 3.  In FM-DA case there exists a generically unique PBNE such that: 
a) There exists an upper-bound [ )∞∈ ,11H  such that ( ) 111*1 , HLHh ≤ , i.e., player 1 selects not 
more than 1H  high signals. 
b) for any 01 ≥H  there exist an upper-bound ( ) [ )∞∈ ,011 HL  and a finite set of lower-bounds 
{ }K
k
kL
11 =
, ( )111 HLK <≤ , ( )11111110 HLLLL kk ≤<<≤ +  such that: 
( ) ( ){ } ( )[ )


∈
≥
=
+1
1111
111111
11
*
1
,if,
if,,min
,
kkk
K
LLLL
HLLHLL
LHl , 
i.e., if the number of low signals does not exceed 11
+kL , only kL1  of them are selected; 
otherwise all of them up to ( )11 HL  are selected in stage 1. 
c) ( )11*1 , LHh  is a weakly increasing function of H1 and does not depend on L1. 
d) ( ) 011 =HL  whenever 11 HH > . 
e) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0, 1111*1 === hLhLLhl  for all *1hh ≥  if ( ) 1*12 qhq < , i.e., if selecting optimal number 
of high signals *1h  makes the screening accuracy in stage 2 lower than in stage 1, none of 
low signals are selected in stage 1. 
f) Player 2 selects an alternative in accordance with the following preference relation: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )LLLHHLHH ssssssss 21212121 ,,,, fff  if ( ) 1222 qLHq >+ , 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )LLHLLHHH ssssssss 21212121 ,,,, fff  if ( ) 1222 qLHq <+ . 
The statements of Proposition 3 can be understood as follows.  First, like in Proposition 2, 
PBNE is generically unique as the pay-off function of player 1 turns out to be a regular 
analytical function of the model’s primitives and, therefore, takes generically different values 
for all different values of its arguments.  Then, selecting one extra signal has two effects on 
pay-offs.  The first effect is the same sample size effect as in Proposition 2: selecting more 
signals in stage 1 increases the probability of observing at least one high signal in stage 2.  The 
other effect, which is now a decreasing accuracy effect, is negative due to the decrease in q2.  
The decreasing accuracy effect, in contrast to the mixing effect from Proposition 2, prevents 
selecting too many signals of both types, thus, there are upper-bounds 1L  and 1H , parts (a) and 
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(b).  If only a few low signals are available, it might be possible that taking none of them is 
optimal even if 01 >L .  Thus, the existence of the lower bound 1L  is established. 
High signals in stage 1 are always more favorable than low signals and, therefore, 
( )11*1 , LHh  is a weakly increasing function of H1 and does not depend on L1, part (c).  Due to 
the same reason, none of low signals will be selected if some high signals are neglected, part 
(d).  Selector 1 selects low signals in addition to high signals only if the screening accuracy in 
stage 2 is still higher than in stage 1.  Otherwise none of low signal will be selected, part (e). 
Comparing Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 one may note that the only difference between 
NM case and DA case is when signals in stage 1 are homogeneous: DA case exhibits 
information overload while NM case does not.  In order show other differences between the 
two cases we provide numerically calculated functions ( )11 HL  and ( )1*1 Hh  in the following 
example. 
Example 2. 
In this example we have selected ( ) nnq 22 01.089.0 ⋅+=  for modeling the decreasing 
accuracy in order to make it comparable with Example 1.  In both cases ( ) 9.022 =q , and 
the decrease in q2 here seems to be negligible.  It turns out, however, that even such small 
decrease in stage 2 accuracy is enough to generate the overload. 
Picture 3 shows, first, that as in NM-CA case, the upper-bound ( )11 HL  is a non-
increasing function and is strictly decreasing function when ( ) 011 >HL .  Second, the 
maximum sample size in stage 1, just like in NM-CA case, is not a monotone function. 
Like in NM-case, the prior α monotonically affects the sample composition: the 
higher the prior is, the less low signals are selected, see next Picture 4.  In contrast, the 
accuracy in stage 1 affects the sample composition non-monotonically: the minimum low 
signals are selected either for very informative stage 1 signals or for almost uninformative 
ones.  Contrary to the NM-CA case, under FM-DA the decrease in stage 2 accuracy 
prevents selector 1 from taking very many low signals even if stage 1 signaling is almost 
uninformative. // 
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As we see, both types of information processing imperfections yield information overload 
in stage 1.  The causes of the overload, however, are different.  In NM case it is the purely 
statistical mixing effect that reduces the incentives to mix heterogeneous signals into a single 
pool.  In DA case it is the decrease in accuracy that makes selection of large samples costly.  
Example 2 shows that even a tiny decrease in accuracy results in the overload.  In order to 
highlight the common features the distinctions in information overload due to these two effects 
we compare equilibrium properties obtained analytically in Proposition 2 and Proposition 3, 
and obtained numerically in Example 1 and Example 2. 
First of all, the mixing effect manifests itself only in heterogeneous samples.  That is why 
in NM case the overload does not arise if only high or only low signals are observed.  
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Picture 3. 
The upper-bound ( )11 HL , denoted as L, the optimal number of high signals ( )1*1 Hh , denoted as h and the 
maximum sample size in stage 1 L+h as functions of 1H , denoted as H for α=0.5, different values of 111 qqq
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and ( ) nnq 22 01.089.0 ⋅+= . 
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Picture 4. 
Regions of the primitives where ( )11LL =  takes particular values.  Here the space of variable primitives is 
( ) [ ] [ ]1,5.01,0, 1 ×=qα  with 111 qqq LH == , and ( ) nnq 22 01.089.0 ⋅+= . 
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Furthermore, when the accuracy in stage 1 vanishes, so does the overload in NM case.  This is 
so because the accuracy in stage 1 determines how heterogeneous high and low signals are. 
When the signaling in stage 1 is very accurate, but still less accurate than in stage 2, the 
sample size effect, which is the other determinant of the overload, vanishes.  In this case the 
overload prevents selecting low signals in stage 1 whatsoever.  Therefore, and this is the second 
principal difference between NM and DA overloads, the accuracy in stage 1 affects the number 
of selected low signals non-monotonically in DA case whereas in NM case this dependence in 
monotone. 
Apart from these two distinctions all the other equilibrium features of NM and DA 
scenarios are very much alike due to the similarities between the mixing effect and the 
decreasing accuracy effect.  Both effects become stronger relative to the sample size effect 
when the number of high signals increases.  That is why the number of selected low signals 
weakly decreases with the number of observed high signals and weakly increases with the 
number of observed low signals in both settings.  When the number of the high signals is 
sufficiently large, none of low signals will be selected. 
Both effects become stronger also for large value of the prior.  In other words, the overload 
is the highest when there are only few low types in the population.  On the contrary, when the 
initial share of high types is very low and, therefore, both high and low signals in stage 1 came 
from low types almost surely, both effects vanish and so does the overload in NM and DA 
cases.  The last, but not least, common feature of NM and DA scenarios is that the resulting 
sample size in stage 1 is a non-monotone function of the sample composition.  This becomes 
very important in a multi-stage generalization of the model 
4.4.NM-DA case 
We finish the analysis of the general 2-stage binary selection model by allowing both sources 
of imperfections, which is our NM-DA case.  Combining Proposition 2 (NM case) and 
Proposition 3 (DA case) we get the following result. 
Proposition 4.  In NM-DA case there exists a generically unique PBNE such that: 
a) There exists an upper-bound [ )∞∈ ,11H  such that ( ) 111*1 , HLHh ≤ , i.e., player 1 selects not 
more than 1H  high signals. 
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b) for any 01 ≥H  there exist an upper-bound ( ) [ )∞∈ ,011 HL  and a finite set of lower-bounds 
{ }K
k
kL
11 =
, ( )111 HLK <≤ , ( )11111110 HLLLL kk ≤<<≤ +  such that: 
( ) ( ){ } ( )[ )


∈
≥
=
+1
1111
111111
11
*
1
,if,
if,,min
,
kkk
K
LLLL
HLLHLL
LHl , 
i.e., if the number of low signals does not exceed 11
+kL , only kL1  of them are selected; 
otherwise all of them up to ( )11 HL  are selected in stage 1. 
c) ( )11 HL  does not increase and strictly decreases whenever ( ) 011 >HL . 
d) There exists a number ( ) 11~ 11 +≤ LH  such that ( ) ( ) ( ) 0, 111*1 === hLhLLhl  for all 1~Hh ≥ , 
i.e., if there are sufficiently many high signals, none of low signals are selected in stage 1. 
e) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0, 1111*1 === hLhLLhl  for all *1hh ≥  if ( ) 1*12 qhq < , i.e., if selecting optimal number 
of high signals *1h  makes the screening accuracy in stage 2 lower than in stage 1, none of 
low signals are selected in stage 1. 
f) The total sample size in stage 1 *1
*
1 lh +  is not a strictly monotone function of H1: it weakly 
decreases when 0*1 >l  and strictly increases when 0
*
1 =l . 
g) Player 2 selects an alternative in accordance with the preference relation (1). 
The proof of Proposition 4 can be obtained by adjusting the proof of Proposition 2 to 
decreasing ( )nq2  function and, therefore, is omitted.  Naturally, when both types of 
informational imperfections are present in the model, the overload of information is the largest.  
The following Example 3 shows the result of imposing the no memory assumption on the FM-
DA case. 
Example 3. 
This example differs from Example 2 only in the memory assumption.  Picture 5 shows 
that in NM-DA case the sample size in stage 2 is even smaller than in FM-DA case.  Next, 
Picture 6 shows that the regions of the prior α and the first stage accuracy LH qq 11 =  where 
selector 1 selects many low signals get smaller. 
One may see that there hardly can be found any criteria that would allow us to classify 
both types of imperfections based on exogenous variables only.  As we have already 
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noticed, the major difference between NM and DA imperfections is in the way they react 
to changes in the accuracy of stage 1 screening, compare Picture 2, Picture 4 and Picture 6 
  // 
We have seen that whatever informational imperfections are, they overload stage 1 
selection.  If it is imperfect information transmission then only low signals will be neglected 
due to the mixing effect.  If it is imperfect information acquisition, both types are affected due 
to the decreasing accuracy effect.  The resulting sample size in stage 2 turns out to be a non-
monotone function of the signal composition in stage 1.  In NM settings this makes the model 
extremely difficult for analytical analysis if there are more than two selection stages.  Indeed, 
Bayesian updates of the beliefs about signaling history of each selected in stage 1 alternative 
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Picture 5. 
The upper-bound ( )11 HL , denoted as L, the optimal number of high signals ( )1*1 Hh , denoted as h and the 
maximum sample size in stage 1 L+h as functions of 1H , denoted as H for α=0.5, different values of 
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Picture 6. 
Regions of the primitives where ( )11LL =  takes particular values.  Here the space of variable primitives is 
( ) [ ] [ ]1,5.01,0, 1 ×=qα  with 111 qqq LH == , and ( ) nnq 22 01.089.0 ⋅+= . 
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requires accounting for a bi-variate binomial distribution of signal realizations in stage 2, a 4-
variate distribution in stage 2 and, in general 2t-1-variate distribution in stage t.  In FM settings 
the very same distributions must be taken into account as well, though not within the beliefs on 
later stages but rather in calculating expected pay-offs in stage 1 
In the following section we will show a way to organize stage-screening procedures such 
that the model becomes analytically tractable in a multistage environment. 
5. Filtering Selection 
We have started the paper by arguing that the decision-maker has internal informational 
imperfections that prevent him from achieving the first best outcome, which is the selection of 
the best feasible alternative with probability 1.  In these circumstances it is very reasonable to 
assume that the very same decision-maker will have difficulties with selecting the optimal 
selection rule for every selection stage (PBNE equilibrium of the game) as well.  Let us 
consider the problem of selection of the best feasible alternative in a wider framework. 
A decision-maker (either a human or a firm) faces the following task.  First, he has to 
decide how many selection stages he is going to implement.  Second, he has to work out 
screening procedures for every stage.  The latter means that the decision-maker derives 
imprecise performance measures, i.e., likelihood functions that will be computed for all 
previously selected alternatives at every stage.  Third, the decision-maker has to find an optimal 
selection rule, i.e., PBNE of the selection model he has built.  And finally fourth, he follows the 
rule in order to select the best alternative. 
In the previous section we analyzed the selection game for arbitrary screening procedures 
on both stages.  It turns out, that imposing either very strong or very weak requirements on all 
stages of the game allows us to generalize the model to an arbitrary number of selection stages. 
When the passing requirements are so strong that only high type alternatives are able to 
meet them, i.e., to pass the filter, low type alternatives always generate low signals.  In other 
words, 1=Ltq .  Thus, the screening filters all high signals as they have necessarily come from 
high types.  When the passing requirements are so weak that only low type alternatives may fail 
to meet them, high type alternatives always generate high signals.  In other words, 1=Htq .  
Thus, the screening filters all low signals out as they have necessarily come from low types. 
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We will call such selection procedures as filtering selection.  In this section we will 
investigate properties of such filtering selection procedures.  We begin with the high standard 
filter 1=Ltq . 
5.1.High Standard Filtering 
It is easily seen that if at a certain stage t the selector t observes some number of high signals, 
in a PBNE he selects one high signal at random and effectively ends the selection with the 
pay-off of 1.  If, on the other hand, he observes only low signals, he can select only low signals 
but not high signals.  Thus, mixing of types does not occur in equilibrium, which has a great 
impact on the solvability of the subgame with an arbitrary number of stages.  Indeed, without 
mixing effect, memory plays no role as every player, having observed more than one 
alternative, infers that all of them generated only low signals in the past. 
It turns out that the high standard filtering selection procedure exhibits no information 
overload provided the initial set of alternatives is large enough. 
Proposition 5.  There exists a threshold level of the population size N  such that for all NN >  
the filtering selection game with 1=Ltq  has a unique PBNE ( ){ }Tttt lh 1**, =  such that for all 
Tt ,,1K= : 
a) ( )tt Hh sign* = , i.e., player t selects one high signal Hts  in stage t if there is one and the 
team gets the pay-off of 1; 
b) ( )( ) ttt LHl sign1* −=  and ( )( )TT Hl sign1* −= , i.e., player t selects no low signals Lts  if there 
is at least one high signal Hts  and he selects all LT=N low signals 
L
ts  otherwise. 
The proof of Proposition 5 is in the appendix.  When the sample size asymptotically 
increases, the probability of observing a high signal in the next stage approaches 1.  Thus, if the 
initial set of alternatives is large enough, every selector selects the whole population if no 
alternative has passed the filter, i.e., only low signals have been generated. 
5.2.Low Standard Filtering 
Like in the previous case, mixing of types does not occur here.  Indeed, if there are high signals 
available, it is strictly dominated to take any number of low signals in addition to the high 
signals.  The only possibility for selecting low signals is when no high signals are available.  In 
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this case selecting any numbers of alternatives are pay-off equivalent and generate zero pay-off.  
Thus, the uniqueness property of PBNE fails.  In what follows we assume that the player who 
observes only low signals is forced to select only one alternative, effectively ending the 
selection. 
Contrary to the filter 1=Ltq , filter 1=
H
tq  always exhibits information overload in a two-
stage filtering selection game. 
Proposition 6.  In the filtering selection game with 121 ==
HH qq  there exists a generically 
unique PBNE such that: 
a) There exists an upper-bound [ )∞∈ ,11H  such that ( ) 111*1 , HLHh ≤ , i.e., player 1 selects not 
more than 1H  high signals. 
b) ( ) ( )111*1 1, HsignLHl −= , i.e., none of low signals are selected unless there are no high 
signal available. 
c) ( )11*1 , LHh  is a weakly increasing function of H1 and does not depend on L1. 
d) Player 2 selects an alternative in accordance with the preference relation (1). 
The proof of Proposition 6 can be easily obtained from the proof of Proposition 3 by 
taking 121 ==
HH qq  and, therefore, omitted.  More interesting results, however, can be obtained 
for the case when the initial prior α is close enough to 1.  The following proposition states the 
result. 
Proposition 7.  There exists a threshold level of the prior 1* <α  such that for all ( )1,*αα ∈  a 
T-stage filtering selection game with 1=Htq  has a unique PBNE ( ){ }Tttt lh 1**, =  such that for all 
Tt ,,1K= : 
a) ( )tt Hh ,2min* = , ( )tT Hh ,1min* = , i.e., player t selects not more than two high signals Hts  
in stage t; 
b) ( )tt Hl sign1* −= , i.e., player t selects no low signals Lts  if there are high signals Hts  
available.  Otherwise, he selects one signal Lts  and the team gets the pay-off of zero. 
We have seen in section 4 that in the general two-stage selection model the overload 
increases when the prior gets larger.  Proposition 7 shows to what extent the overload limits the 
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number of selected high signals: the minimum possible number of alternatives for making a 
nontrivial choice in later stages, namely two, will be selected.  This result holds true for any 
strictly decreasing function ( )nqLt .  The reason is that the sample size effect vanishes when α 
approaches 1 and only decreasing accuracy effect is still working.  The following corollary is a 
direct consequence of Proposition 7. 
Corollary 1.  If the number of selection stages T in the filtering selection game with the filter 
1=Htq  is sufficiently large, then starting from a certain stage T
* every selector selects at most 2 
high signals, i.e., ( )tt Hh ,2min* =  for all t>T*. 
Indeed, selecting only high signals in the beginning of the game assures that at stage T* the 
prior share of high types *Tα  becomes sufficiently close to 1 as 
( ) ( )( )∏
=
−−+
= t
k
k
L
k
t
nq
1
11 αα
α
α , 
and 1lim =
∞→
tt
α .  When α does not satisfy conditions of Proposition 7, the number of selected 
high signals remains to be a relatively small integer.  For instance, for two-stage selection 
game, if the revealing probability function ( )nqLt  satisfies the following condition for all nn ≥ : 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )nLnLL nqnqnq 111 2122 +−>+− −α , (2) 
then player 1 never selects more than n  high signals.1  One can easily see that condition (2) is 
satisfied for 2≥n  for any strictly decreasing ( )nqLt  when α approaches 1, which is exploited in 
the proof of Proposition 7.  Condition (2) can also be generalized for an arbitrary number of 
selection stages.  Due to the exponential structure of the right-hand-side of (2), the condition is 
satisfied for relatively small numbers.  For example, even for the tiny decrease in the accuracy 
generated by the function ( ) nLt nq 1000001.09.0 ⋅+=  and for α=0.5 the inequality is satisfied for 
all 27≥n  and, therefore, not more than 27 alternatives are selected.  The true upper-bound in 
this case is equal to 25. 
                                                 
1 See appendix for the proof. 
 25
6. Conclusion 
We developed a model of fully rational agents with internal informational imperfections.  
Those imperfections are introduced by assuming limits on information acquisition and 
information transmission.  These assumptions are justified and supported by the clear analogy 
they have with the human brain’s computational limitations already pointed out by 
experimental studies in psychology.  With this framework we are able to obtain and explain 
information overload phenomenon.  It enables us to challenge the paradigm «more information 
is better» as in our model neglecting valuable information emerges as an endogenous behavior 
of fully rational agents, while in most models of bounded rationality such behavior is 
exogenously imposed.  The forces and mechanisms responsible for the overload are also 
investigated in deep details. 
Even more striking results are obtained, when we turn our attention on screening 
procedures that take a form of filtering.  When selection requirements at all stages are weak in a 
sense that good alternatives always satisfy them and bad alternatives are gradually filtered out, 
information overload appears in its most severe form: relatively few alternatives are sufficient 
in order to make an efficient choice.  An opposite case, when selection requirements at each 
stage are highly demanding, meaning that bad alternatives never satisfy them and even good 
alternatives may fail to do so, is the only example where information overload does not arise at 
all and the whole set of alternatives has to be passed to the next selection stage. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 2.  First, we derive the team’s pay-off function u(h1,l1) provided selector 
2 plays his unique weakly undominated strategy and the screening accuracy in stage 1 is lower 
than in stage 2.  u turns out to be a rational analytical function of the model primitives 
LHLH qqqq 2211 ,,,,α  and, therefore, it takes generically different values for different values of its 
arguments ( ) [ ] [ ]1111 ,0,0, LHlh ×∈ .  Hence, there exists a generically unique PBNE. 
Then, we show that u strictly increases with h1 and, therefore, ( ) 111*1 , HLHh = , i.e., 
statement (a) of the proposition.  Next, we fix 11 ≥H  and investigate the shape of u as a 
function of discrete argument L1.  It turns out that u may generically have two local maxima: 
the interior maximum at l1>0 and the corner maximum at l1=0.  We define an upper-bound as 
the value of l1 at which u attains its global maximum: 
( ) ( )11011 ,maxarg 1 lHuHL l≤= . 
If the interior maximum does not exist we define ( ) 011 =HL  as in this case u strictly decreases 
for all l1.  Then, we define a lower-bound as the smallest l1 that yields at least u(H1,0): 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ){ }


≥≤<
><
=
otherwise,0,,,0min
0allfor0,, if ,0
1111111
1111
11 HulHuHLll
lHulHu
HL  
It is easy to see that the optimal number of low signals *1l  that selector 1 has to select, which is 
defined as ( ) ( )11011*1 ,maxarg, 11 lHuLHl Ll ≤≤= , is zero if 11 LL <  and is equal to ( ){ }111,min HLL  if 
11 LL ≥ , i.e., statement (b) of the proposition.  Lastly, we derive the properties (c), (d), (f) and 
(g) of functions ( )11 HL  and ( )11 HL .  In order to prove part (e) we note that if the screening 
accuracy in stage 1 is higher than in stage 2, none of low signals are selected in stage 1 in the 
presence of high signals, that is ( ) ( ) ( ) 0, 111*1 === hLhLLhl .  Part (h) is trivial. 
In what follows we use the following notations: 
( ) ( ) LLHLLL qq 2121 11 γγϕ −+−= , ( ) ( ) LHHHHL qq 2121 11 γγϕ −+−= , 
HL
HH
HH q
ϕ
γγ
−
=
1
21 , LL
HL
LH q
ϕ
γγ
−
=
1
21 , ( )HL
HH
HL q
ϕ
γγ 21 1−= , ( )LL
HL
LL q
ϕ
γγ 21 1−= . 
Suppose player 1 selects h1 signals Hs1  and l1 signals 
Ls1 .  For any x and y such that 
10 hx ≤≤  and 10 ly ≤≤  there is a chance that exactly x alternatives out of h1 and exactly y 
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alternatives out of l1 will generate high signals Hs2 .  The probability of this event is given by 
the following bivariate binomial distribution: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ylLLyLLxhHLxHL
l
y
h
x
hyhxlhyx −− −



⋅−



=⋅=
11 11PrPr,,Pr
11
1111 ϕϕϕϕ . 
When this event occurs receiver 2 observes x+y high signals Hs2 .  If x+y>0 the pay-off of the 
receivers is LHyx
yHH
yx
x γγ ++ + .  If, on the other hand, x=y=0, the pay-off is LHlh
lHH
lh
h γγ
11
1
11
1
++ + .  
Thus, the team’s pay-off is: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ).,0,0Pr,,Pr
,0,0Pr,,Pr,
11
1
1
1
11
1
11
1
1
1
11
0
1
11
11
0
0
1111
LLLHLLHL
lh
h
ly
hx
y
x
yx
xLHHHLH
LL
lh
lHL
lh
h
ly
hx
yx
yx
LH
yx
yHH
yx
x
lhlhyx
lhlhyxlhu
γγγγγγγ
γγγγ
−−−+−+=
+++=
+
=
=
=
=
+
++
=
=
>+
==
++
∑
∑
 
Converting the finite sum above into an integral yields: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ).
11,
11
111
11
1
0
11
LLLHLLHL
lh
hlLLhHL
w
w
hHLHLlLLLLLHHHLH wdwlhu
γγγγϕϕ
ϕϕϕϕγγγ
−−−+
+−+−+−+=
+
=
=
∫  
It is a routine to see that ( )11 ,1 lhu +  can be written as: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ,,0,0Pr,,Pr
,,Pr1,1
11
1
11
1
1
1
1
1
11
1
11
0
0
11
0
11
1
1111
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
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
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γγγγϕ
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and, then, that ( ) ( ) ( ) 0,,1, 111111 >−+≡∆ lhulhulhuh : 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( )( )
.0
1
,,Pr1
11
1
1,0,0Pr,
1
1
0
11
1111
1
1111
>
+++
−−+
+



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
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
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llhlhu
γγϕ
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Thus, ( ) 111*1 , HLHh = . 
Let us now fix any 11 ≥h  and define 
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( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )LLHLlLLhHLLLHLlLLhHL l h
lhulhu
h
lhulhD
γγϕϕγγϕϕ −
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≡
−
∆
≡
1111
1
1111
1
11
11
,1,,, , 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
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1
1111111,
11111
1
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11
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dwwwwlhD
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and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )11111111 ,1,,, lhDlhDlhDlhE l −+≡∆≡ , 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( ) .
21
21
1
1111111,
111111
1
0
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11
11
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It is easily seen that ( ) 0, 11
1
<
∂
∂ lh
l
E  and ( ) −∞=
∞→
11,lim
1
lhE
l
.  Thus, there are two cases. 
a) ( ) 00,1 <hE .  In this case ( ) ( ) 00,, 111 << hElhE  and, therefore, ( ) ( )1111 ,1, lhDlhD <+  and 
( ) −∞=
∞→
11,lim
1
lhD
l
.  Thus, ( )0,1hD  determines the behavior of ( )11, lhu .  If ( ) 00,1 <hD  then 
( ) 0, 11 <lhD  and u always decreases.  This happens, e.g., for 5.0=α , 6.011 == LH qq , 
9.022 ==
LH qq , 61 =h , see Picture 7(a).  If, on the other hand, ( ) 00,1 >hD , then u first 
increases to its interior maximum ( )11 HL  and decreases afterwards.  This happens, e.g., for 
1.0=α , 6.011 ==
LH qq , 9.022 ==
LH qq , 61 =h , see Picture 7(b). 
b) ( ) 00,1 >hE .  In this case there exists a number X such that ( ) ( )1,0, 11 −<< XhEXhE , i.e., 
( )11, lhD  has a unique maximum at Xl =1 .  If ( ) 0,1 <XhD  then ( ) 0, 11 <lhD  and u always 
decreases, as in Picture 7(a).  If, on the other hand, ( ) 0,1 >XhD  then u has a unique 
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Picture 7. 
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interior maximum at Xl >1  and decreases afterwards.  In this case, if ( ) 00,1 >hD  u 
increases for all Xl <1 , as in Picture 7(b); if ( ) 00,1 <hD  u has a local minimum for some 
Xl <1 .  This happens, e.g., for 9.0=α , 78.011 ==
LH qq , 9.022 ==
LH qq , 11 =h , see 
Picture 7(c). 
For all three types of shapes of u the definitions of the upper-bound and the lower-bound 
are consistent, thus, statement (b) of the proposition is proven. 
In order to show that ( )11 HL  is a decreasing function we consider 3 cases. 
a) Suppose that for both 11 Hh =  and 111 += Hh  ( )11, lhu  attains its global maximum at the 
interior points, ( ) 0111 >= HLl  and ( ) 01111 >+= HLl  respectively.  We will show that 
( ) ( ) 11 1111 −≤+ HLHL .  To this end we note that ( ) 0, 11 <lHD  for all ( )111 HLl ≥ .  Let us 
consider a difference ( ) ( )1111 ,1,1 lHDlHDF −−+≡ : 
( )
( )
( )( )( )
( )
( )
,0
11111
11
1
1
1
0
11
2
11
11
<
−


 −
+


 −
+−×
×
−−−
−
−
−
+
−
−
−
−=
∫
=
=
−−w
w
H
HL
HLl
LL
LL
LLHL
HLLLLLHL
LLHL
LHHHLL
LLHL
LLLH
dwwwww
HH
F
ϕ
ϕ
ϕ
ϕ
ϕϕ
ϕϕϕϕ
γγ
γγϕ
γγ
γγ
 
as ( )( ) 012211 >−+−=− LHLHHLLL qqγγϕϕ .  Thus, ( ) 0,1 11 <+ lHD  for all ( ) 1111 −≥ HLl  
and, therefore, ( ) ( ) 11 1111 −≤+ HLHL , i.e., ( )11 HL  strictly decreases. 
b) Suppose that for 111 += Hh  ( )11, lhu  attains its global maximum at the corner 
( ) 01111 =+= HLl .  Then trivially ( ) ( ) 010 1111 ≥≤+= HLHL . 
c) The only possibility left is to assume that for 11 Hh =  ( )11, lhu  attains its global maximum 
at the corner ( ) 0111 == HLl  while for 111 += Hh  it attains its global maximum at the 
interior point ( ) 01111 >+= HLl .  We will show that this can never be true. 
As ( )1111 += HLl  is assumed to be an interior maximum, it must be that 
( ) ( )1,10,1 1111 −+<<+ lHDlHD , i.e., ( ) 01,1 11 <−+ lHE  for ( )1111 += HLl .2  In 
addition, as at 11 Hh =  ( ) 0111 == HLl  is assumed to be a global maximum, it must be that: 
                                                 
2 This inequality is nothing more than the second order condition in the discrete form. 
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for all 01 >l .  But then 
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as ( ) 01,1 11 <−+ lHE  at ( )1111 += HLl .  Therefore, ( ) 0,1 11 >+ lHG  for all 01 >l  as well.  
But this contradicts the assumption we made that for 111 += Hh  ( )11, lhu  attains its global 
maximum at the interior point ( ) 01111 >+= HLl . 
All the three cases prove part (c) of the proposition.  Part (d) follows from 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 01,01,0 111 >−−=−+ LLlLLLLLHlulu ϕϕγγ . 
Parts (d) and (g) are direct consequences of part (c). ■ 
Proof of Proposition 3.  First, we derive the team’s pay-off function ( )11, lhu  provided selector 
2 plays his unique weakly undominated strategy induced by ( ) 1*12 qhq > .  Then, we show that u 
strictly increases with respect to both arguments provided the accuracy in stage 2 is constant 
 33
that proves Proposition 1 for the case 12 qq > .  When 12 qq < , the utility is given by the same 
function ( )0,1hu , as no low signals will be selected.  This completely proves Proposition 1. 
As in the proof of Proposition 2, ( )11, lhu  turns out to be a rational analytical function of 
the model primitives ( ){ }NnLH nqqq 1211 ,,, =α  and, therefore, it takes generically different values for 
different values its arguments ( ) [ ] [ ]1111 ,0,0, LHlh ×∈ .  Hence, there exists a generically unique 
PBNE.  Next, we show that for any strictly decreasing function q2(n), which satisfies 
Assumption 3, ( )11, lhu  asymptotically decreases with respect to both arguments.  This proves 
the existence of upper bounds 1H  and 1L , parts (a) and (b).  Then we define lower-bounds 
kL1  
as a convenient way of expressing ( )11*1 , LHl  that ends the proof of part (b).  Parts (c) and (d) 
are proven by deriving properties of the upper-bounds.  Finally, if ( ) 1*12 qhq < , none of low 
signals are selected and the team’s pay-off function ( )11, lhu  becomes ( )0,1hu , part (e). 
In what follows we use the following notations: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )nqnqn LLLL 2121 11 γγϕ −+−= , ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )nqnqn HHHL 2121 11 γγϕ −+−= , 
( ) ( )( )n
nqn HL
H
HH
ϕ
γγ
−
=
1
21 , ( ) ( )( )n
nqn LL
L
LH
ϕ
γγ
−
=
1
21 , ( ) ( )( )( )n
nqn HL
H
HL
ϕ
γγ 21 1−= , ( ) ( )( )( )n
nqn LL
L
LL
ϕ
γγ 21 1−= . 
Having been written without the argument, the above variables are assumed to be evaluated at 
22 qq = , or, alternatively at ∞→n .   Then, the team’s pay-off in case 12 qq >  is: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( ).
11,
1
111
11
1111
LLHLLLLHlLLLHHHhHLHH
LLHLLLlLLLHlLLhHLHHhHL
hsign
hsignlhu
γγγγϕγγϕγ
γγγϕγϕϕγϕ
−−−+−−=



−++−+−=
 
It is clearly seen that for constant q2: 0
1
>
∂
∂
h
u  and 0
1
>
∂
∂
l
u .  Thus, 1
*
1 Hh =  and 1
*
1 Ll =  in this 
case, that proves Proposition 1. 
When q2(n) is a strictly decreasing function this is not the case any more.  In order to show 
that we use Assumption 3 that yields: 
( )( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
( ) ( ) 01lim1lim 2222 =+−=+− ∞→∞→ nqnq
n
nqnq
n nLL
n
nHL
n
ϕϕ  (A.1) 
First, we show that when only high signals are available at stage 1, i.e., L1=0, u 
asymptotically decreases with h1.  Let ( ) ( ) ( )0,10,0, +−= nununMU  for 1≥n  denotes the 
marginal disutility of having an extra high signal.  Then, using (A.1) yields 
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ϕ
γγγγ , 
Thus, for L1=0 there exists an upper bound ∞<1H  such that ( ) 11*1 0, HHh ≤ . 
Then, it is easy to see that ( ) ( ) 0,1,1 >−−−−+≡∆ hnhuhnhu : 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
.0
121 211
1
11
>
−−−+−−=
−+−+−
−−+−−=∆
−−
−
−−+
nnnqnnnnn
nnnnnnn
nnnnnnn
HLLHLHhnLLLHHHHLhHL
HLLHhnLLLHHHhHLHH
HLLHhnLLLHHHhHLHH
γγγγϕγγϕϕ
γγϕγγϕγ
γγϕγγϕγ
 
Thus, if 1
*
1 Hh < , i.e., some high signals are neglected, then 0
*
1 =l , i.e., no low signals will be 
selected, part (d) of the proposition. 
In case 01 >L  and 11
*
1 ≥= Hh , let ( ) ( ) ( )1,,, 111111 +−−−=− HnHuHnHuHnHMU  
denotes the marginal disutility of having an extra low signal.  Then we define: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )1
,lim
22
11
1 +−
−
≡
∞→ nqnq
HnHMUHF
n
, 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( ) ( ) ( ) 12211112112111 111 111 121 111 1 −−−− −−+− −+−− −= HHLLLHL
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We will show that F(H1)>0.  It is clear that F(H1)>0 for any 211 ≥
Hγ .  On order to show that 
F(H1)>0 also for 211 <
Hγ , we define 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )( )
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and consider 2 cases: 
a) Let ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) 2212112211 12111211 qqqq HLLLHLH −−−+−≥−+− γϕγγγγ .  As G strictly 
increases, ( ) ( )( )( )( ) 012111 221 >−−−−=′ qqhG HLLHL γϕϕ , 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( ) 0121112110 2212112211 ≥−−−−−−−+−=≥ HLHLLLHLH qqqqGhG ϕγϕγγγγ . 
In this case ( ) 0>hG  for all h>0.  Thus, ( ) ( ) 01 >−+ hFhF .  But then for all H1>0: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 01
10 2
11
1 >
−
−
=>
hHL
LL
LL
FHF ϕ
ϕ
γγ . 
b) Let ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) 2212112211 12111211 qqqq HLLLHLH −−−+−<−+− γϕγγγγ .  In this case: 
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Let ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )( )hHLHLHLHLHHLLLHH hqqhQ ϕϕϕγγγϕϕγγ −+−−−−−−= 112111 2211111  
such that ( ) ( )( ) ( ) HLLLHL
hQhF
ϕϕϕ −−
>
11 2
.  Then 
( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )hHLHLHLHLHLHLH hqqhQ ϕϕϕϕϕγγγ ln11121 22111 −++−−−−−=′ . 
Using 1ln −< xx  for x<1 yields: 
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Thus, 
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and, therefore, F(h)>0. 
Summarizing both cases yields that F(H1)>0 for all H1>0 and, therefore, ( ) 0, 1 >− HnhMU .  
Thus, for any 11
*
1 ≥= Hh  there exists an upper bound ( ) ∞<11 HL  such that ( )11*1 HLl ≤ . 
If there are no high signals available, i.e., 01
*
1 == Hh , the marginal disutility of having an 
extra low signal ( ) ( ) ( )1,0,0,0 +−= nununMU , for large n becomes: 
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( ) ( )
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≡
∞→∞→ LL
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ϕ
γγγγ . 
That proves the existence of an upper bound ( ) ∞<01L . 
The set of lower-bounds is recursively defined as follows: 
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We stop this process at stage K when 111
1
1
−+ >= KKK LLL .  It is easy to see that the optimal 
number of low signals *1l  that selector 1 has to select, which is defined as 
( ) ( )11011*1 ,maxarg, 11 lHuLHl Ll ≤≤= , is equal to 
kL1  when 
1
111
+<≤ kk LLL  and is equal to 
( ){ }111,min HLL  when KLL 11 ≥ , that ends the proof of the proposition. ■ 
Proof of Proposition 5.  In what follows we will use the following notations: 
( ) ( )tLttttLt nqn ααϕ −≡ 1, , ( ) ( )( )( )ttLt
t
L
tt
tt
L
t n
nqn
,
1,
αϕ
α
αγ −≡ . 
Here tα  stands for the prior in the beginning of stage t; 
L
tγ  stands for the posterior at the end 
of stage t provided a low signal is observed, such that Ltt 1−= γα ; nt stands for the sample size in 
the beginning of stage t, such that nt+1=Ht+1+Lt+1=ht+lt. 
If player t observes some number of high signals Hts , the strategy 1
*
=th  weakly 
dominates all the others.  Thus, ( )tt Hh sign* = .  The rest of the proof is based on the induction 
assuming that only low signals were available. 
The ex-ante pay-off function ( )TTT nu ,α  in the last stage T is given by 
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Suppose that in stage t the ex-ante pay-off function ( )ttt nu ,α  is 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
1
1 11111111,
−
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−
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
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t
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t
L
tttttt nqnqnu ααααα . 
The corresponding reduced form pay-off function ( )111 , −−− ttt lu α  in stage t-1 is given by: 
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It is easily seen that ( ) 1, 111 <−−− ttt lu α  for all lt-1 and ( ) 1,lim 111
1
=
−−−
∞→
−
tttl
lu
t
α .  Thus, there exist a 
number 1−tN  such that for all 11 −− > tt Nn : 11
11
maxarg
−−≤
=
−−
ttnl
nu
tt
.  This implies that 1
*
1 −− = tt nl .  
Taking into account that this happens only when 01 =−tH , this can be written as 
( )( ) ttt LHl sign1* −= . 
Then the ex-ante pay-off function ( )111 , −−− ttt nu α  in stage t-1 becomes: 
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Thus, for any Tt ,...,1=  there exists tN  such that ( )( ) ttt LHl sign1* −=  for all tt Nn > .  Taking 
1NN =  ends the proof. ■ 
Proof of Proposition 7.  In what follows we will use the following notations: 
( ) ( ) ( )tLttttLt nqn ααϕ −≡ 1, , ( ) ( )ttLt
t
tt
H
t n
n
,1
,
αϕ
α
αγ
−
≡ . 
Next, as it is never optimal to mix high and low signals, ( ) ( )1111, −−−− ≡ tHtttt hsignh γαα . 
We solve the model using backward induction.  First, we derive the team’s ex-ante pay-off 
function ( )TTT nu ,α  in the last stage, that defines the reduced form pay-off function in stage T-
1, i.e., ( ) ( )( )111111 ,,, −−−−−− = TTTTTTTT hhuhu ααα  for hT-1>0.  Maximizing the latter expression 
w.r.t. hT-1 we show that there exists an * 1−Tα  such that ( )1* 1 ,2min −− = TT Hh  and 
( )1* 1 sign1 −− −= TT Hl  for all ( )1,* 11 −− ∈ TT αα . 
Next, we derive the ex-ante pay-off function ( )111 , −−− TTT nu α  in stage T-1.  We generalize it 
to an arbitrary stage t, i.e., ( )ttt nu ,α  using induction arguments, at the same time showing that 
there exists an ( )1,0* 1 ∈−tα  such that the corresponding reduced form pay-off function in stage t-
1 is maximized at ( )1* 1 ,2min −− = tt Hh  and ( )1* 1 sign1 −− −= tt Hl  for all ( )1,* 11 −− ∈ tt αα . 
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In stage T, when the sample size is nT>0 and the prior is αT, selector T selects a high signal, 
if there are, and gets a pay-off ( )TTHT n,αγ , which happens with probability ( )( ) TnTTLT n,1 αϕ− .  
With the remaining probability ( )( ) TnTTLT n,αϕ  all signals in stage T are low and therefore, he 
selects one of them and gets zero.  Thus 
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Suppose that 21 ≥−TH .  Then, it is easy to see that ( ) ( )1,2, 1111 −−−− > TTTT uu αα : 
( ) ( ) ( ) 02,1,2, 111111 >=− −−−−−− HTLTHTTTTT uu γϕγαα . 
On the other hand, 
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Thus, there exists an ( )1,0* 1 ∈−Tα  such that ( )1* 1 ,2min −− = TT Hh  for all ( )1,* 11 −− ∈ TT αα .  If 
01 =−TH  player T-1 has no better option than to take one low signal and to get zero pay-off.  
Thus, ( )1* 1 sign1 −− −= TT Hl . 
Ex-ante pay-off in period T-1 can now be written as 
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Suppose that at stage t the ex-ante pay-off function is given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) tnLttn
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where ( )1,0∈tβ .  Suppose also that there exists an ( )1,0* ∈tα  such that ( )tt Hh ,2min* =  and 
( )tt Hl sign1* −=  for all ( )1,*tt αα ∈ .  The corresponding reduced form pay-off function in stage 
t-1 is given by ( ) ( )1111 ,, −−−− = tttttt huhu αα .  Suppose that 21 ≥−tH .  Then, it is easy to see that 
( ) ( )1,2, 1111 −−−− > tttt uu αα : 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) 021211,2, 111111 >−+−=− −−−−−− tLtLtHtHttttt qquu βγγαα . 
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On the other hand, 
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Thus, there exists an ** 1 tt αα >−  such that ( )1,* 11 −− ∈ tt αα , ( )1* 1 ,2min −− = tt Hh  and 
( )1* 1 sign1 −− −= tt Hl  for all ( )1,* 11 −− ∈ TT αα .  The ex-ante pay-off in period t-1 can be written as 
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where ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )∏
=
−
−−=−+=
T
tk
L
kt
L
t
L
tt qqq 2112121 ββ . 
Hence, by the induction, for any t=1,…,T-1 there exists an ( )1,0* ∈tα  such that for all 
( )1,*tt αα ∈  and for all t≥τ : ( )ττ Hh ,2min* =  and ( )ττ Hl sign1* −= .  Taking t=1 with *1* αα =  
ends the proof. ■ 
Derivation of (2). 
For two-stage filtering selection with 1=Htq  the residual-form pay-off in stage 1 is given by 
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kLHH hqhu γγα . 
The marginal disutility of having an extra high signal ( ) ( ) ( )1,, +−= nununMU αα  becomes: 
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Thus, if ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )nLnLL nqnqnq 111 2122 +−>+− −α  for all nn ≥ , then nh ≤*1 . ■ 
